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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals may reverse a decision

where, due to the untimely filing of the appeal, the Appellate
Court is deprived of jurisdiction.
2.

Whether Certiorari should be granted to review a sum-

mary decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to the non-existence
of a partnership between the parties in the "Wine Cup Ranch".
3.

Whether Certiorari should be granted to review a sum-

mary decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's
ruling that the parties' Decree of Divorce should not be modified
to reallocate the parties' debts and obligations, including tax
obligations owed the Internal Revenue Service,
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Order of Affirmance of the Court of Appeals (not for
publication), was served upon all parties on November 20, 1987
and is found in the Appendix hereto.
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Respondent does not dispute this court's jurisdiction over
the petition for certiorari under Utah Code Annotated Section 782-2 (1953 as amended).

Petitioner Monte Tipton obtained a timely

ex parte order granting an extension of time in which to file his
Petition of Certiorari.

1

CONTROLLING RULES
RULE 43

CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW OF CERTIORARI

Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but
of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor.
The following, while
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a
decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of the
Court of Appeals on the same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a
question of state of federal law in a way that is in conflict
with a decision of this Court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a
departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of this
Court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important
question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been,
but should be settled by this Court.
Rule 43, R. Utah S. Ct.
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Given the nature of a petition for certiorari, Petitioner
Monte

Dee Tipton

is required to present special and

reasons why review by this court is merited.

important

Respondent Celia

Tipton respectfully submits that no compelling reasons for certiorari

exist.

To

the

contrary, Respondent's

jurisdictional,

equitable and legal defenses serve to establish that certiorari
is not appropriate under these circumstances.
A persistent obstacle to appellate review, both by the Utah

2

Court of Appeals, and now by this court in the context of a petition for certiorari, is the lack of a complete or adequate record of proceedings below.

At the April 5, 1985 "trial" for di-

vorce, both parties submitted packages of documentary evidence,
lists of issues, and other materials to the trial judge, the
Honorable James S. Sawaya.

All of the "evidence" upon which

Judge Sawaya ruled consisted of proffered testimony and documentary evidence which was never included as part of the official
clerk's record.

Respondent refuses to accept the burden properly

placed on Petitioner Monte Tipton to provide a sufficient record
to permit the kind of appellate review he now seeks. (See e.g., 4
Am. Jur. 2d "Appeal and Error", Section 409, p.870.)
Although Respondent Celia Tipton denies the factual exposition set forth in Monte Tipton's petition for writ of certiorari,
the total inadequacy of the formal record, noted above, the nature of a petition of writ of certiorari,! discussed below, and
the untimeliness of Monte Tipton's prior appeal all argue against
a detailed listing or disapproval of the asserted "facts" presented by Monte Tipton.
ARGUMENT AGAINST ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
I.
CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED WITHOUT
SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, set forth in
its entirety above, recognizes that review by certiorari is not a
3

matter of right but of discretion.

In Bocrcres v. Morris, 635 P.2d

39 (Utah 1981), decided before the establishment of our present
two tiered appellate system, the discretionary nature of the writ
for certiorari was noted by this court.

Pursuant to Rule 43 it

is the burden of a petitioner to establish "special and important
reasons" for the issuance of a writ.

The petition presently be-

fore this court meets none of the illustrative criteria for certiorari found in subdivisions

(1) through

(4) of Rule 43 and

Monte Tipton can offer no other "special" or "important" reason
why he should be afforded an extra level of appellate review.
Given the untimeliness of Monte Tipton's previous appeal, a
jurisdictional fact which is, in itself, fatal to Monte Tipton's
present petition, further appellate review is inappropriate.
II.
PETITIONER MONTE DEE TIPTON'S
PREVIOUS APPEAL WAS UNTIMELY
The addendum contains an abbreviated chronology of events
and previous court orders which serve to establish that the Order
of Affirmance of the Utah Court of Appeals was entirely proper on
jurisdictional grounds.

Monte Tipton simply delayed too long be-

fore seeking Appellate review.

Under the circumstances, certior-

ari is totally inappropriate.
The events from May 9, 1985 are particularly significant.
Both the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Order
relating to the same, which are the principle subject of this
4

Petition, were entered by Judge Sawaya on May 9, 1985.

Monte

Tipton's May 2 0 Motion for New Trial, etc. tolled the time for
appeal

from

Judge

Sawaya's

Order,

Findings

and

Conclusions

(U.R.A.P. 4(b)).
Following a hearing before the trial court on the Motion for
New Trial, etc., Judge Sawaya executed and entered his Order denying Monte Tipton's various motions.

That Order was entered by

the court clerk in the docket sheet on September 23, 1985 and
mailed to all counsel.

It contained no directions for any party

to prepare another order for the court, nor were findings and
conclusions necessary.
As recognized in U.R.C.P. 58 A(c) "A judgment is complete
and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation
of a lien on real property, when the same is signed and filed as
herein provided."

As Rule 54 (a) notes, the term "'judgment' ...

includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies."

En-

try of Judge Sawayafs order on September 23, 1985 commenced the
running of Monte Tipton's time to appeal (U.R.A.P. 4(b):

"The

time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the
order denying a new trial or granting or denying any such other
motion.").
Monte Tipton himself recognized the appealability of Judge
Sawaya's September 23, 1985 order in the first Notice of Appeal
which he filed months later —

on April 19, 1986.
5

By that time,

Monte Tipton's right to appeal had already expired (U.R.A.P. 4).
Celia Tipton's filing of a redundant and duplicative Order on May
20, 1986 did not serve to extend the time to appeal.

As recog-

nized in Larsen v. Larsen 657 P. 2d 1350, 1351 (Utah 1983), a
case involving duplicative, and redundant, judgments, the time
for appeal runs from the first judgment or order.
III.
CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED TO REVIEW
THE COURT OF APPEAL'S AFFIRMANCE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

The Trial Court's Findings and Order that Monte Tipton and
Celia Tipton Were Not Partners is Correct and Adequate.
Given the absence of affirmative evidence by Monte Tipton as

to the alleged "partnership", affirmance by the Court of Appeal
of the trial court's finding concerning partnership should stand.
The effective limits upon a trial judge's findings and conclusions were noted by this court in Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank,
673 P. 2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983) and Pearson v. Pearson 561 P.2d
1080, 1082 (Utah 1977).
Celia Tipton does not dispute the statements of her counsel,
Richard B. McKeown, or counsel for Monte Tipton, Peter W. Guyon,
set forth at length at pages 13 through 16 of the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari.

Such proffered testimony, including Celia

Tipton's denial of the non-existence of a supposed "partnership",
effectively deprived the trial judge of the ability to conclude
6

that a partnership actually existed.

Without adequate affirma-

tive evidence of a partnership, Judge Sawaya gave that issue all
the attention it deserved in his Findings and Conclusions.

In

this regard, it should be kept in mind that Monte Tipton himself
prepared and executed the stipulation containing the very property distribution provisions of which he now complains (See, Abbreviated Chronology in Addendum, entry of 03-04-83).
In considering the existence of a partnership between the
parties, the absence of a presumption in fayor of such a finding,
and the burden of proof upon Petitioner Monte Tipton, is clear:
The existence of a partnership will not be presumed,
but must be proved... In accord with the general principle that the burden of proof to establish the affirmative of an issue involved in an action rests upon the
party alleging the facts constituting that issue, the
burden of proving the existence of a partnership is ordinarily on him who alleges and relies on the fact of
its existence and this rule applies to one who alleges
a partnership by estoppel as well as to one who attempts to establish a partnership as between the parties to the action. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, "Partnership",
Section 80, p. 993-994.

In this regard, the lack of a written partnership agreement
or any other documentary evidence initiated by Monte Tipton is
significant.

The New York Supreme Court ruled in Hanlon v. Mel-

fi, 423 N.Y.S. 2d 132, 134 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1979):
A partnership is an association of two or more persons
to place their money, efforts, labor or skill, or some
or all of these in lawful commerce for business and to
divide the profits and bear the loss in certain proportions (citation omitted). The fact that there is no
written agreement of partnership is not conclusive in
determining whether or not a partnership exists but it
7

is an element to be taken into serious consideration in
determining where the thrust of the controversy is.
Where no partnership agreement is executed in writing
by the parties, it must be determined from the testimony, from the conduct of the parties, and especially
from the documentary evidence, whether or not a partnership existed. The burden, of course, of establishing the existence of an oral partnership by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence rests upon the
party claiming the partnership (citation omitted). It
has further been held that an indispensable requirement
of a partnership is a mutual promise or understanding
of the parties to share in the profits of the business
and submit to the burden of making good the losses,
(citations omitted).
Monte Tipton's bald assertion that a property settlement
provision creates a partnership between himself and his former
wife strains credulity.

No "effort, labor or skill" was ever

contributed to this partnership by the Respondent.

The property

settlement provision in question spoke of a distribution of monies to be generated from a note, but was totally silent about any
distribution of losses.
supposed partnership.

There was no venture engaged in by this

It is also clear that the mere division of

monies owed under a note does not constitute "a share of the proceeds of a business" as defined by Section 48-1-4(4) Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended).
Respondent respectfully submits the trial court's conclusion
was inescapable.

The parties' joint involvement was limited to a

single transaction, the payment of a debt through division of
proceeds from a note, not an on-going business venture (Cf. Koeslincr v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah 1975).
8

Celia Tipton

contributed neither property nor services (Cf. Kimball v. McCornick, 259 P. 313, 314 (Utah 1927).

There was no meeting of the

minds on a business, orally or in writing, (Cf. Johanson Brothers
Builders v. Board of Review, Industrial Coiitmission, 222 P.2d 563,
567 (Utah 1950).

For these reasons, Judge Sawaya appropriately

rejected Appellant's partnership claim as an afterthought induced
by his continued difficulty with the IRS.
B.

The Court of Appeals Properly Affirmed, Summarily, the Trial
Judge's Refusal to Modify the Parties' Decree of Divorce.
Concerning Monte Tipton's claim of inadequate written find-

ings, the Respondent hereby incorporates by reference her previous discussion found above.

Again, Respondent submits that the

sparsity of the trial court's findings was largely mandated by
Monte Tipton's own inability to present evidence in support of
his position.

Contrary to Monte Tipton's bald assertions, the

trial court's decision as to a lack of "changed circumstances"
was entirely in line with previous decisions of this court.
example, in

For

Foulcrer v. Foulcrer, 626 P. 2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981) it

was held:

[

The change in circumstance required to justify a modification of the Decree of Divorce varies with the type
of modification contemplated... Where a disposition of
real property is in question however, the court should
properly be more reluctant to grant a modification. In
the interest of securing stability of titles, modifications in a decree of divorce, making distribution of
real property, are to be granted only upon a showing of
compelling reasons arising from a substantial and material change of circumstances.
9

The above holds true a fortiori where the property disposition is the product of an agreement and stipulation
between the parties, and sanctioned by the trial
court. Such a provision is the product of an agreement
bargained for by the parties. As such, a trial court
should subsequently modify such a provision only with
great reluctance, and based upon compelling reason.
Absent such substantial change, a divorce decree cannot be collaterally attacked due to the doctrine of res judicata.

Kessimakis

v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978).
The Court of Appeals1 Order of Affirmance effectively disproved Monte Tipton's claim that his tax liability was something
he could not have known.

Parenthetically, it should be observed

the Respondent Celia Tipton engaged her own tax expert to advise
her as to the tax consequences of the proposed property settlement stipulation.

In addition, well known Utah authorities have

spoken of the need to consider the tax consequences of marital
property settlements for some time.

The following excerpt from

the Summary of Utah Family Law, Journal of Legal Studies, (1980)
B.Y.U., Section 12.18, p. 311, is illustrative:
The tax consequences of the property settlement need to
be analyzed carefully. Alimony is often taxable to recipient and deductible to the payor. Division of the
marital estate may give rise to a tax liability because
of the liquidation of the assets. In some situations,
transfer of assets between spouses upon divorce may
trigger a taxable event. An award of real property
will normally include a corresponding property tax
obligation.
Monte Tipton's failure to consider these matters is rendered
even more inexcusable in light of his admitted history of contro10

versy with the Internal Revenue Service.

At the trial he admit-

ted disputes with the IRS years before he proposed the property
settlement agreement which he now would like to rewrite:
Now, there is another circumstance that Mr. Tipton
would testify to, and that is that he had previous1
problems with the Internal Revenue Service because of
the nature of his business and I will try to give the
Court an outline a little later on if I can. Right now
let me state that in 1980 Mr. Tipton settled with the
Internal Revenue Service a $271,000 claim they had
against him for $162,000... (R.T. p. 20, lines 7-14).
Amazingly, Monte Tipton's proffered testimony at trial was
that at the time that he proposed the property settlement agreement to Celia Tipton, he was aware of tax consequences, generally, and believed that he was taking care of them:
But in any event, during 1978 through 1982, he (Monte
Tipton) continued to accrue certain tax liabilities
which he in his own mind felt he was taking care of by
investment
tax
credits
and
other
vehicles.
(R.T. p. 21, lines 2-5.)
C.

The Trial Court's Ruling On Modification, Affirmed by The
Court of Appeals, Is Supported by Weighty Principles of
Equity.
1.

Principles of Compromise Supported the Trial Court's
Denial of Modification.

The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement prepared by Petitioner's counsel included provisions concerning property settlement that, according to paragraph 9 thereof, were intended to be
"complete and

final."

In paragraph 11 thereof, both parties

declared:
11

It is understood and agreed to by the parties hereto
that this agreement constitutes a complete, fair and
equitable settlement of any claims the Plaintiff Celia
Sherwood Tipton has or may have against any and all
property, whether the same be real or personal, owned
by Defendant Monte D. Tipton or which Defendant Monte
D. Tipton may have an interest...
The provisions of paragraphs 13 and 14, cited below, highlighted the fact that both parties understood that they were
agreeing

to

compromise

all claims that they might have had

against the other:
It is understood by both parties that Plaintiff's
claims against all property, real or personal, owed by
Defendant, prior to, during, or subsequent to the parties' marriage, are disputed and that the instant
agreement is entered into for the purpose of settling
all such disputed claims...
Both parties enter this agreement of their own free
will and choice, and assert that they do so willingly
and that they are fully aware of the ramifications of
this agreement...
Under Hornbook principles relating to the public policy behind settlement agreements, and their effect, Monte Tipton's demand to re-write his agreement should be denied.
The law favors the resolution of controversies and uncertainties through compromise and settlement rather
than through litigation, and it is the policy of the
law to uphold and enforce such contracts if they are
fairly made and are not in contradiction of some law or
public policy. 15A Am. Jur. 2d, "Compromise and Settlement", Section 5, p. 777.
Once the parties have entered into an agreement settling a disputed claim, neither party will, in the absence of any element of fraud or bad faith, be permitted to repudiate it. Id, Section 7, p.779.
Indeed, a principle related to the concept of compromise and
12

settlement provides that the acceptance of the benefits of a decree precludes a party from appealing the same:
A party who accepts an award or legal advantage under
an order, judgment or decree, ordinarily waives his
right to any such review of the adjudication as may
again put in issue his right to the benefit which he
has accepted. This is so even though the judgment, decree or order may have been generally unfavorable to
the Appellant. Whether a party who accepted benefits
under a judgment actually intended to waive his right
to appeal is, as a general rule, immaterial. 4 Am.
Jur. 2d, "Appeal and Error," Section 250, pp. 745-746.
Monte Tipton's tardy discovery that he had miscalculated his
tax obligations is no reason to excuse him from his own agreement.
2.

Principles of Contract Construction Supported Denial of
Appellant's Request for Modification.

The settlement agreement incorporated in the Decree of Divorce provided that Respondent should receive "a fifty per cent
(50%) partnership share of the balance due to the parties hereto
from the Sierra Pacific note...".

Any ambiguity should be con-

strued against Petitioner as the drafter of the agreement.

The

rule and rational is well explained in tl>e Restatement of Contracts, Second, Section 206:
In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise
or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who
supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise
proceeds.
Comment:
a. Rationale.
Where one party
chooses the terms of a contract, he is likely to provide more carefully for the protection of his own interests than for those of the other party. He is also
more likely than the other party to have reason to know
13

of uncertainties of meaning.
Indeed, he may leave
meaning deliberately obscure, intending to decide at a
later date what meaning to assert. In cases of doubt,
therefore, so long as other factors are not decisive,
there is substantial reason for preferring the meaning
of the other party.
This court long ago recognized, in such cases as Twiggs
v. The State Board of Land C f rs, 75 P. 729 (Utah 1904), that as
between two innocent parties to an agreement, the party whose
conduct caused the loss should bear the loss.
It is an equitable principle that where litigants assert conflicting claims, and hence, loss or prejudice
must be born by one of them, the decision in the event
that they are shown to have been equally 'innocent1 —
that is, ignorant of the harmful consequences of their
acts — must be rendered against the party whose conduct brought about the prejudicial situation. In this
respect it is frequently said that where one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through his agency the
loss occurred must bear it. Similarly, it is often
said that where one of two parties, both guiltless of
intentional wrong, must suffer a loss, the one whose
conduct, act, or omission occasions the loss, must
stand the consequences. 27 Am. Jur. 2d "Equity", Section 146, pp. 682-683.
3.

Modification of a Property Settlement Contract Should
Not be Permitted for Unilateral Mistake.

Although Respondent is not aware of any Utah decisions which
even approximate the case here presented, a Colorado appellate
court was called upon to decide whether a United States Tax Court
determination, adverse to the husband with respect to the payment
of maintenance, was sufficient grounds to modify a maintenance
and property settlement agreement.
2d 543

(Colo. App. 1984).

Re Marriage of Hall, 681 P.

After considering rules relating to
14

the interpretation of contracts, as well as the existence of a
valid "integration clause" (substantially identical with the one
drafted by the Appellant, R. 14, Par. 25) the Colorado Court
ruled as follows:
Where no question of fraud, bad faith or inequitable
conduct is involved, and the claim of a right to reform
a contract is [based] solely on a mistake, it is absolutely necessary that the mistake be mutual, and that
both parties understood the contract to be different
from what it shows on its face, and that the interest
of the contract would have been different except for a
mistake. (citation omitted). A party's prediction or
judgment as to events to occur in the future, even if
erroneous, is not a 'mistake1 for the purpose of making
a contract voidable. Restatement Second of Contracts,
Section 151c.
Of similar relevance, Mr. Justice Traynor of the California
Supreme Court authored a carefully reasoned examination of the
issue of modification of a property settlement decree on the
basis

of

subsequently

v. Kulchar

462 P. 2d

discovered
17,

20

(Cal

tax

liability.

In Kulchar

1969), Mr. Justice

Traynor

considered what kinds of mistake justify modification of property
settlements:
Moreover, a mutual mistake that might be sufficient to
set aside a contract is not sufficient to set aside a
final judgment. The principles of res judicata demand
that the parties present their entire case in one proceeding.
'Public policy requires that pressure be
brought upon litigants to use great care in preparing
cases for trial and in ascertaining all the facts. A
rule which would permit the re-opening of cases previously decided because of error or ignorance during
the progress of the trial would in a large measure
vitiate the effects of the rules of res judicata.'
(Rest., Judgments, Section 126, com. a ) . Courts deny
relief, therefore, when the fraud or mistake is ' in15

trinsic'; that is, when it 'goes to the merits of the
prior proceedings, which should have been guarded
against by the Plaintiff at that time.'
(Citations
omitted.)
Significantly, in Kulchar., both parties agreed that a mistake had been made as to the tax consequences of their property
settlement agreement.

In our case, however, Respondent has re-

peatedly denied that any mistake occurred.
CONCLUSION
None of the "special and important reasons" for certiorari
required by Rule 43 are present here.

The Order of Affirmance of

the Utah Court of Appeals was entirely appropriate on the basis
of Monte Tipton's jurisdictional failure to file a timely appeal.
However, looking at the arguments raised in the petition for certiorari itself, it is clear that the trial court's decisions, affirmed on appeal, are correct and appropriate in all necessary
respects.

Plaintiff and Respondent Celia Tipton respectfully

urges this court to deny Monte Tipton's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
DATED this 18th day of February, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE

SSXJUJ

Richard B. McKeowr
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC^
I hereby certify that four copies of the above and foregoing
were hand delivered this 18 th day of February, 1988 to the
following:
Peter W. Guyon
GUYON & HUNTER
Attorneys at Law
330 East 400 South, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo
Celia Sherwood Tipton,
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
(Not for Publication)

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v*

Case No. 860205-CA
Monte Dee Tipton,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Orrae, Davidson and Greenwood (On Rule 31 Panel)

Pursuant to Rule 31 of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Double
costs are awarded to respondent under Rule 33(a) of the Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals. O'Brien v. Rush, 67 Utah Adv. Rep.
18, 20-21 (Ct. App. 1987).
FOR THE COURT:

Gregory K. Qrfhe, Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of November, 1987, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Affirmance was mailed to each
of the following:
Peter W. Guyon, Esq*
Guyon & Guyon
1000 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Richard B. McKeown, Esq.
Parker McKeown & McConkie
505 East 200 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Hon. James S. Sawaya.
Third District Court
Salt Lake County
Dist. Ct. #D82-3162

Julia CV-tfhitfield
Case Management Clerk
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ADDENDUM
ABBREVIATED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND PLEADINGS
DATE

EVENT/PLEADING

REFERENCE

10-29-78

Celia Sherwood Tipton, now known as Celia
Demman, and Monte Dee Tipton married.

Complaint
for Divorce
R.2.

08-06-82

Plaintiff and Respondent herein, Celia
Tipton, filed her Complaint for Divorce.

R.

2-6.

LO-22-82

Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, prepared by counsel for Petitioner Monte Tipton,
filed for both parties with consent of Celia!s
counsel.

R.

7-14

32-08-83

Minute Entry of Divorce pursuant to Stipulation made by Judge Bryant H. Croft.

R.

15

33-04-83

Findings and Conclusions, drafted by Respondent's Counsel, filed with the Court.

R.

16-22.

33-04-83

Decree of Divorce signed by Judge Croft.

R.

23-29.

04-04-83

(Right to Appeal Decree of Divorce expires)

(U.R.A.P.

09-21-84

Respondent Celia Tipton filed her Motion for
Order to Show Cause against Monte Tipton for
failure to comply with the terms of the Decree
of Divorce.

R.

30-31

LO-29-84

Petitioner Monte Tipton filed his Verified
Motion to Dismiss; Order to Show Cause: For
Contempt; For Judgment Against Plaintiff:
And For Other Relief.

R.

39-45

32-22-85

Petitioner Monte Tipton filed his Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce.

R.

49-52

33-04-85

Following oral argument, Commissioner Sandra
Peuler filed written recommendations as to
all pending motions by all parties. Specifically, the Commissioner found that Petitioner
should bear the tax liability which forms the
basis for his Petition for Certiorari.

R.

59-60

B-l
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04-05-85

Counsel for both parties appeared before Judge
James S. Sawaya and proffered evidence relative
to issues in dispute. The issues to be decided
were agreed upon by stipulation. Documentary
evidence and lay and expert testimony, was proffered, but not presented to the court.

Reporter'' s
Transcript
of Proceedings pp.
1-50.

04-2 6-85

Judge Sawaya issued a Memorandum Decision resolving all issues presented to him. Counsel
for Celia Tipton is directed to prepare an Order
for the Court's signature.

R. 110-113

05-09-85

Findings and Conclusions are signed by Judge
Sawaya in support of his Memorandum Decision.

R. 114-118

05-09-85

Judge Sawaya signed and entered an Order finalizing his Memorandum Decision.

R. 119-122

05-2 0-85

Counsel for Petitioner Monte Tipton filed a
Motion for New Trial; to Take Additional
Testimony; To Amend Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law; and to Amend Judgment.
(Time to appeal tolled)

R. 123-130

U.R.A.P. 4b

09-23-85

Counsel for both parties appear before Judge
Sawaya to argue Monte Tipton's Rule 59 Motion
for New Trial, etc.

Reporter's
transcript
pp. 51-60

09-2 3-8 5

Judge Sawaya signed and entered an order denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial, etc.
The order was entered by the clerk in the
docket sheet. Copies were mailed by the clerk
to all counsel on 09-24-85.

R. 136

10-23-85

(Right to Appeal Judge Sawaya's Order of
of 09-23-85 expires)

U.R.A.P. 4

04-19-86

Monte Tipton filed his Notice of Appeal from
the Order of Judge Sawaya of 09-23-85.
(Notice untimely).

R. 144

05-20-86

Counsel for Respondent Celia Tipton filed a
second Order, signed by Judge Sawaya, duplicating the Order of Judge Sawaya of 9-23-85.

R. 149
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06-13-86

Petitioner Monte Tipton.filed his Amended
Notice of Appeal from both Judge Sawaya's
personally prepared order of 09-23-85 and
the redundant Order prepared by Respondent's
Counsel of 05-20-86. (Notice untimely.)
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R. 151

